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Abstract
There has been a wide-spread misconception based on the impre-
cise wording of Art. 52 of the European Patent Convention (EPC)
that the protection of business methods by patents is prohibited in
Europe. This paper investigates the legal framework set by patent
laws with respect to the patentability of business methods, contrast-
ing the situation in lege in Europe and the situation in the US. It is
shown that in praxi business methods have never been excluded from
patentability in Europe. In the empirical part of the paper, 1,901 Eu-
ropean patent applications relating to business methods are identified
and major patent indicators are computed. Further, a case study from
the franking device industry which is characterized by strong competi-
tion for intellectual property rights is conducted. It contains evidence
for the strategic use of business method patents leading to opposition
rates against granted patents of 44%.
Keywords: Business Method Patents, Patent Opposition, EPO, Franking
Device Manufacturers
JEL Classification: L69, O34
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1 Introduction
There has been a wide-spread misconception based on the wording of the
European Patent Convention (EPC), which is not easily understood by non-
experts, that the protection of business methods by patents is prohibited in
Europe.1 As a consequence, a significant body of the legal, academic and
business community believes that there is no patent protection available for
business method inventions within the European patent system.2 However,
a closer look reveals that business methods are eligible for patentability
in Europe and are actually being granted by the European Patent Office
despite the apparent exclusion in Article 52 EPC.
Currently, there is no empirical study to date that focusses on the
patentability of business methods in Europe. The purpose of this paper
is twofold: First, the legal situation concerning the patentability of busi-
ness methods in Europe is discussed after summarizing the current debate
on the sense and non-sense of patenting business methods. Furthermore,
it will be shown that business methods can be patented in Europe, but
under somewhat stricter legal conditions than in the US where patents on
business methods are granted regularly. The second purpose of the paper
is to provide a first empirical look at business method patents in Europe.
1,901 business method patent applications filed at the EPO are identified
and analyzed with respect to various patent characteristics. The results are
compared to previous findings from a comprehensive study of USPTO busi-
ness method patents of Allison & Tiller (2003) revealing that there are no
significant differences between the two jurisdictions. Further, a case-study
from the industry for franking devices reveals clear evidence for the strategic
use of business method patents in Europe. In this industry, one firm relies
heavily on business method patents in constructing a large patent portfolio
used for bargaining in licensing negotiations. This behavior is part of the in-
tense competition for intellectual property rights in this industry, illustrated
by an average opposition rate of 44% against granted patents.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In section 2, an
overview over previous studies of business method patents is given and ma-
jor concerns about these patents are highlighted. Section 3 contains a short
summary of the legal framework with regard to the patentability of busi-
ness methods in Europe. Section 4 describes the research design applied in
this paper and briefly comments on the resulting dataset representing 1,901
European patent applications which are equivalents to granted US business
method patents from US patent class 705. In this section a descriptive anal-
ysis of the data with respect to patent characteristics, legal procedures and
applicant structure is presented. Section 5 provides evidence for the strate-
1Compare Art. 52 of the EPC.
2For a full treatment of this subject see Beresford (2000).
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gic use of business method patents from a case study analyzing their use in
the industry for franking devices. Finally, section 6 summarizes the major
results and states implications of the findings.
2 Business Method Patents – A Summary of the
Current Debate
The concept of business methods is notoriously difficult to define. From an
economic perspective, the term ”business method” is very broad and com-
prises various economic activities such as selling and buying items, marketing
or finance methods, schemes and techniques. From a legal perspective, it
is hard to find an abstract definition of what exactly constitutes a business
method and what makes it different from other ”methods”. Currently, nei-
ther European nor US (patent) laws contain a legal definition of the term
business method while actually using it frequently (Hart et al. 2000).
Only recently have legislators and patent offices in the US and Europe
turned their attention to this problem: The European Patent Office (EPO)
suggested in one of its publications (which became the basis of the European
Commission’s software patentability proposal of 2002/02/20) that a business
method is any subject matter which is ”concerned more with interpersonal,
societal and financial relationships, than with the stuff of engineering – thus
for example, valuation of assets, advertising, teaching, choosing among can-
didates for a job, etc... .”However, this coarse definition has not yet been
implemented in applicable law.
In the US, a first attempt to define business methods is contained in
”The Business Method Patent Improvement Act” which was first proposed
to the US congress by Congressmen Berman and Boucher in 2000. The pro-
posal defines a business method as ”(1) a method of - (A) administering,
managing, or otherwise operating an enterprise or organization, including a
technique used in doing or conducting business; or (B) processing financial
data; (2) any technique used in athletics, instruction, or personal skills; and
(3) any computer-assisted implementation of a method described in para-
graph (1) or a technique described in paragraph (2)”. The US congress did
not accept the proposed bill and therefore current US laws do not contain a
legal definition of the term business method yet. Nevertheless, the definition
of Berman and Boucher is – at least implicitly – applied in most studies of
business method patents and is therefore appropriate for the purpose of this
paper.
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
During the recent years, there has been a steep increase in applications
for business method patents in the sense of this definition in the US (see
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Figure 1) which drew the interest of numerous scholars, from both eco-
nomics and law, to the business method phenomenon. This resulted in a
variety of studies discussing whether business methods should receive patent
protection or not and on the consequences which could arise from granting
patents on business related ideas. The remainder of this section contains
a short summary of the major issues of the current discussion on business
method patents, covering quality related issues, examination procedures and
welfare implications.
Patent Quality Inventions must satisfy certain criteria in order to
be patentable. These are novelty, involvement of an inventive step and
industrial applicability. Moreover, invention must not be excluded from
patentability due to legal reasons. Additionally to the fulfilment of these
criteria, any patent application must disclose details about the invention
enabling a third person ”skilled in the art” to understand and to implement
the invention by studying the patent document. Given these requirements,
low patent quality might arise if patents are granted for inventions which do
not fully satisfy the patentability criteria or the disclosure requirements (Hall
et al. 2003, pp. 2-3). A more detailed discussion of the emergence of low
quality patents is contained in National Research Council (2004, pp. 46-63).
One of the major allegations against business method patents is the lack of
novelty respectively non-obviousness of the protected inventions. Dreyfuss
(2000) points to a number of patents which were granted on methods well
known to the public before the applicant sought patent protection. Most of
the cited patents were involved in invalidity litigation for not satisfying the
novelty and the non-obviousness criterion. Dreyfuss (2000) summarizes the
interpretations of the novelty and non-obviousness criteria by the judges in
the court decisions as follows: ”What judges don’t understand they think
is patentable [...] what judges do understand (or think they should pretend
they understand), appears obvious.” Bagley (2001) and Lunney (2001) raise
further doubts on the quality of business method patents finding that exist-
ing inventions and methods are not sufficiently considered in determining the
novelty and obviousness of computer-implemented business method inven-
tions. This deficiency gives rise to patents protecting computerized versions
of long known business practices.3
Deficiencies of examination procedures Most of the described defi-
ciencies of business method patents are attributed to an inadequate examina-
tion practice of the responsible patent offices. The major problem identified
3A good example is Priceline’s US patent Nr. 5,794,207 protecting a ”Method and ap-
paratus [...] designed to facilitate buyer-driven conditional purchase offers” which protects
an internet-based version of the reverse-auction mechanism, where the buyer specifies the
product he wants to purchase and the seller offering the lowest price wins the right to
deliver the product.
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by most observers are problems with the search for prior-art contained in
previously issued patents and particularly in non-patent documents. Merges
(1999) and Kuester & Thompson (2001) illustrate a systematic problem with
prior art searches in patent databases: Patent examiners at the USPTO look
solely at the issued US patents filed prior to the filing date of the applica-
tion being examined. Before the recent facilitation of obtaining patents on
business methods (especially after the State Street vs Signature Financial
decision, see section 3) many applications were not filed at all because of
the perception that business methods are not patentable. Therefore, most
of the prior art was not contained in patent documents which stressed the
importance of the search in non-patent documents. However, the search for
prior art in non-patent sources is complicated by two facts: First, business
methods are rather directly implemented without being documented, mak-
ing it hard to find any written prior art. Second, Hart et al. (2000) and
Hunt (2001) report that patent offices are not provided with appropriate
databases for prior art searches in non-patent documents. Their argument
suggests that patent examiners can therefore hardly identify existing prior
art documents due to limited resources of the patent offices.
Welfare Implications Patents are temporary exclusionary rights which
are granted to the inventor in exchange for the publication of a so far un-
known invention. If patents are granted erroneously (i.e. patents are granted
on inventions and methods which should not be protected by patents), they
might be used unwarrantedly to deter entry or induce exit of firms com-
peting with the patent holder by the threat of infringement suits inducing
negative welfare effects. In fact, Lerner (1995) has shown that fear of lit-
igation may cause smaller entrant firms to avoid areas where incumbents
hold many patents. Since a firm can improve its competitive position by
obtaining patents there is an incentive to maximize the size of the patent
portfolio at a given level of R&D effort. This argument is similar to the
’patent portfolio race’ in the semi-conductor industry described by (Hall &
Ziedonis 2001).
Furthermore, low quality patents can have a negative effect on social wel-
fare since licensing and litigation costs are increased due to more difficult
negotiations when low-quality patents or more patents are involved. For ex-
ample, numerous and overlapping (in their claims) patents held by different
parties make it costly for a potential infringer to bargain a license or even
to determine who to bargain with (Heller & Eisenberg 1998). Addition-
ally, broad and imprecise claims increase the number of potential infringers
and therefore the probability of costly litigation. Hall et al. (2003) give a
more detailed analysis of welfare implications of patent litigation and the
consequences of low-quality patents.
Finally, the granting of low-quality patents might also slow down cumula-
tive inventions as well as the diffusion of new inventions. Meurer (2002) and
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Hall et al. (2003) argue that if previous inventions are protected by patents
of dubious quality or excessive breadth, the cost of pursuing inventions rely-
ing on them might be discouraging for cumulative inventions. Furthermore,
growing numbers of patents might lead to a high degree of fragmentation
of property rights protecting previous inventions. This fragmentation might
increase the transaction cost of getting access to these technologies (Heller
1998). Hall & Ziedonis (2001) illustrate this problem of ’patent thickets’ in
their analysis of the U.S. semiconductor industry.
3 The Patentability of Business Methods under
the European Patent Convention
While it is widely acknowledged that business methods are patentable sub-
ject matter in the US, there has been some confusion as to whether business
methods can be patented under the European Patent Convention (EPC).4
Article 52 (2) of the EPC defines which inventions are patentable and ex-
plicitly expels business methods from patentability in paragraph (c) by ex-
cluding ”schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts, playing
games or doing business, and programs for computers” from patentable
subject matter. However, according to Art. 52 (3) of the EPC the pro-
visions of paragraph (2) only exclude inventions from patentability ”to the
extent to which a European patent application or European patent relates to
such subject-matter or activities as such”. In a series of cases, the Board
of Appeal at the EPO concluded that the legislator did not want to exclude
all business methods from patentability by combining the two provisions of
Art. 52 (2) and (3) EPC and decided that patentability is allowed for – at
least – some business methods (Hart et al. 2000).
However, the major problem is to determine which business methods
can be protected by patents. Since business methods are excluded from
patentability only ”as such”, a clear definition of what is meant by a busi-
ness method ”as such” is needed for this purpose. Complicating the situa-
tion, there is no legal definition of what the ”as such”-formulation actually
means, leaving it open to interpretation. Hellfeld (1989) gives a comprehen-
sive overview of different interpretations of the ”as such”-restriction formed
in numerous court decisions and the judicial literature. Because of the un-
clear meaning of the EPC’s ”as such”-formulation, the Board of Appeal
finally ruled that this criterion cannot be decisive for the distinction be-
tween patentable and not-patentable business methods. This view has been
4In 1998, in the famous State Street Bank and Trust Co. vs Signature Financial Group-
decision involving US patent No. 5,193,056, the United States court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit ruled that business method patents are patentable subject matter (Conley
2003, pp. 21 - 23). See also http://www.law.emory.edu/fedcircuit/july98/96-1327.
wpd.html
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developed in a series of decisions concerning applications seeking patent pro-
tection for business methods and computer programs throughout the 90’s
(see Hart et al. 2000, Tang et al. 2001).
The criterion developed by the Board of Appeal for the distinction be-
tween patentable and non-patentable business methods is the technical
character of the underlying invention/ method. However, determining
what lends an application of a business method patent the necessary tech-
nical character and takes it beyond the exclusion from patentability is ex-
tremely difficult. Again, there is no formal definition of this criterion. The
relevant decisions of the Board of Appeal on the technical character of busi-
ness method related patent applications during the 90’s (listed in Hart et al.
(2000) or also Tang et al. (2001)) can be summarized as follows: A patent
application must contain technical considerations either in the underlying
problem solved by the claimed invention, the means of solving the underlying
problem, or in the technical effects achieved in the solution of the problem.
Anders (2001) gives a thorough treatment of what exactly determines the
technical character of business related inventions from a legal perspective
considering recent developments at the European level. His arguments can
be summarized by stating that almost any computer-implemented invention
is sufficiently technical making the criteria of novelty and inventive step
decisive for a patent grant in Europe (Anders 2001, p. 558). Blind et al.
(2003) derive a slightly more restrictive interpretation of the technicality
criterion from recent court decisions but admit that patents on computer-
implemented inventions are regularly granted by the European patent office.
Meanwhile, the discussion reached policy makers at the European Com-
munity level who recently discussed the new EU directive on the patentabil-
ity of computer-related inventions with direct impact on the regulatory
framework of the EPC. The European Parliament decided in a first to
maintain and reinforce the exclusion of software and business methods from
patentability in September 2003. However, the Council of the Ministers of
the European Community voted on March, 18th, 2005 in the 2645th meeting
on competitiveness of the Council of the European Union for a directive
making it possible to patent both software and business methods if they are
sufficiently technical (Council of the European Community 2004). Hence,
under the current regulation patents on business methods can be granted
by the EPO and national patent offices in Europe as long as the underlying
invention satisfies the criterion of being sufficiently technical as well as the
other criteria of patentability.
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4 Analysis of European Business Method Patents
4.1 Research Design and Data Description
A variety of empirical studies of US business method patents try to de-
termine whether US business method patents are particular compared to
average patents with respect to patent characteristics like quality, scope or
value, see for example Allison & Tiller (2003) or Hunter (2003). These stud-
ies do not find clear evidence that business method patents are different
from other patents from a statistical point of view. In Europe, there are no
comparable studies for business method patents. The only exception that
can be found, is in a study by Likhovski et al. (2000) who analyze a set of
300 business method patent applications. However, they present only de-
scriptive statistics of the nationality of the patent applicants in their sample
without analyzing further characteristics. In this section, 1,901 European
business method patents are identified and analyzed with respect to various
patent characteristics. Furthermore, the frequency of legal actions challeng-
ing the validity of granted patents within the European opposition system
is scrutinized.
Empirical studies of European business method patents are hampered by
the fact that there is no simple way to identify business method patent ap-
plications at the EPO. Patent applications in other technological areas can
be identified rather easily since the EPO classifies all patent applications
according to the technological field they belong to for easy retrieval in the
future. However, the International Patent Classification (IPC) scheme used
by the EPO for this purpose does not contain any subsections devoted to
business method patents. Therefore business method patents are classified
into a number of different IPC classes which do not exclusively contain busi-
ness method patents. This classification practice makes it nearly impossible
to identify these patents by simply looking at the technological classification
provided by the EPO.5
In contrast, the USPTO uses its own classification scheme, which con-
tains a separate class devoted exclusively to business methods. Patent Class
705 entitled as ”Data Processing: Financial, Business Practice, Manage-
ment, or Cost/Price Determination” encompasses machines and methods
for performing data processing or calculation operations, where the machine
is used in the administration or management of an enterprize, the process-
ing of financial data or the determination of the charge for goods or services
(USPTO 1999). The USPTO defines business method patents simply as
patents classified in Class 705. It should be noted that the ”Business Meth-
ods Patent Initiative” announced by the USPTO in 2000 led to a tightening
5The EPO only recently advocated the introduction of a new class G06Q (which will
contain applications related to business methods) in the 8th revision of the IPC forthcom-
ing 2006 (Gianotti 2005).
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of the examination procedures for patent applications classified as Class 705
applications in the US. Coincident with the introduction of a second review
of the applications as other measures of a more rigorous examination the
number of patent grants fell in Class 705 fell sharply in the first quarter of
2000 (National Research Council 2004, p.56). The drop in applications for
business method patents (see Figure 1) might be explained by changes in
the applicants’ filing strategies – trying to avoid Class 705 with their patent
applications – due to the policy change of the USPTO.
The strategy for identifying business method patent applications at the
EPO pursued in this paper makes use of the fact that these patents can
be identified at the USPTO via the US classification rather easily: In a
first step, a search in the USPTO’s patent database 6 for patents classified
in Class 705 was performed yielding the set of granted USPTO business
method patents. Using EPO’s online database http://ep.espacenet.com,
it can be checked whether an application for an equivalent patent had been
filed at the EPO.7 The knowledge of existing twin pairs ’EPO-patent – US
equivalent’ allows to identify all EPO patent applications with an existing
US equivalent classified in Class 705. Based on the classification of the
USPTO, it can be assumed that the underlying invention of the patent
application actually is a business method. Hence, EPO patents with an
equivalent USPTO patent in Class 705 will be treated as European business
method patents for the remainder of the paper.
While this identification strategy ensures comparability with previous
studies of USPTO business method patents (relying also on Class 705 clas-
sification), there are selection issues which should be kept in mind when
interpreting the results of the following analysis. The USPTO database
used for this study contains only granted patents since the USPTO started
to publish all patent applications only in November 2000. As a conse-
quence, EPO business method patent applications are only identified if and
only if a patent on the underlying invention has been granted in the US.
Hence, this design yields only a subset of all existing EPO business method
patents. EPO applications with no equivalent application filed in the US or
with an equivalent US application which didn’t lead to a granted patent are
not included in the sample. Therefore a certain share of European business
method patent applications is not identified using this strategy and reported
figures like the absolute number of applications or patents granted can serve
only as lower bound of the unknown number. However, it can be assumed
that the likelihood of the existence of international equivalents is an in-
6USPTO patents are available online at http://www.uspto.gov/patft/index.html,
latest visit on September, 9th, 2004.
7If patent protection for a given invention is sought in more than one jurisdiction, the
different patents are called equivalent patents. The underlying equivalent definition of
the Espace database is that for two documents to be described as equivalents, all their
priorities must be the same.
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creasing function of the value of a patent. Therefore more valuable patents
should be contained in the sample reducing the selection problem. Further,
it should be noted that the avoidance of Class 705 after the tightening of
the according examination procedures as described above might exacerbate
the identification of European business method patent applications for the
years after 2000.
The dataset used in this study was gathered performing a search for
US business method patents using the online USPTO database (http:
//www.uspto.gov/patft/index.html) on March 1st, 2004 which yielded
8,550 US business method patents in Class 705. From the publicly avail-
able EPO patent database ESPACENET a dataset containing all existing
pairs ’EPO patent – equivalent patents’ has been constructed on March
3rd, 2004. Matching this dataset with the USPTO business method patents
yielded an overlap of 1,901 European patent applications related to business
methods with application dates ranging from 1978 to 2002. The data on
the 1,901 European 705-equivalents was further augmented to include infor-
mation on individual patent files from a comprehensive EPO patent dataset
previously described by Harhoff & Wagner (2005).8 The resulting dataset
contains information on the patent applicant, the application procedure,
patent characteristics as well as information on post-grant opposition.
4.2 Applications and Applicants of Business Method Patents
at the European Patent Office
Table 1 gives an overview of the nationalities of applicants. At the EPO
level, European applicants are responsible for about 23% of all applications
for business method patents. American applicants file more than 56% of
all applications for business method patents in Europe. This result is in
line with previous findings of Likhovski et al. (2000). The dominance of US
applicants in the field of business method patents in Europe is remarkable
as US applicants are responsible for only 29% of all patent applications at
the EPO.
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
Figure 2 illustrates the yearly number of applications broken down by
the origin of the patent applicant distinguishing applicants from Europe,
the US and Japan. It is striking that the recent growth of business related
patent applications starting in the first half of the 90’s was largely driven
by the tremendous growth of American applications quadrupling between
8This database contains extensive bibliographic and procedural information on patent
applications published by the EPO between 1978 and 2003.
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1993 and 1998; filings from Europe and Japan merely doubled in the same
period. It seems likely that the steeper increase of US business method
patent applications in Europe is a direct consequence of the higher awareness
of the availability of business method related patents in the US due to widely
noted court decisions in validity and enforcement cases. This hypothesis is
supported by the fact that the strong growth of US applications relative to
other nations appeared at the same time as the simplification of the US laws
concerning business method patents.
Table 2 shows the distribution of the outcomes of the application pro-
cedures. The comparison of the applications for business method patents
with the total population of all 1,266,506 patent applications filed at the
EPO reveals only minor differences in the overall outcomes of the applica-
tion procedures. While the grant rate is slightly higher for business related
patent applications, the inverse is true for the share of patents which have
been withdrawn by the patent applicant before a final decision by the EPO
was published (see Table 2). Discriminating patent applications by the ori-
gin of their applicant reveals some differences across countries (see Table 1):
While European and Japanese patent applications are characterized by an
above-average success-rate of 74.67% and 81.25% of all applications lead-
ing to patents, attempts of US applicants were successful in only 59.60% of
all filings. The phenomenon of lower success rates of US applicants is not
confined to business methods but can be found over all patent applications
with grant rates of about 55.70% for US applicants.
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
Table 3 lists the 14 most active applicants for business method patents
at the EPO. They account for more than 40% of all identified applications.
Column 3 of Table 3 contains the number of all applications filed (including
pending cases) and the number of granted patents can be found in column 4.
Most of these applicants are multinational corporations from technological
fields such as consumer electronics, computer technology and telecommu-
nications which patent a variety of different business methods. However,
three of the top five applicants are exceptions in their size and technological
focus of their operations: Being concentrated on a narrow business field,
Pitney Bowes, Frankotyp-Postalia and Neopost Ltd. are specialists in the
niche for mailroom technology like franking or inserting machines and ser-
vice providers for mail processing in companies. The patenting activities
of these three firms largely focus on advanced methods for electronic frank-
ing devices e.g. a ”method for billing despatch services” (EP19980250253,
Frankotyp-Postalia). In total, they account for more than 15% of all appli-
cations for business method patents making mailroom technology one of the
biggest single technology clusters within the field of business methods. In
fact, the respective IPC-class G07B17/00-04 ”Franking apparatus” contains
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19.57% of all business method patents identified, most held by the three
firms.
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
4.3 Patent Characteristics
During the last decade, researchers started to employ characteristics of the
individual patent both in theoretical and empirical studies to explain in-
dustrial structures and strategic behavior of firms introducing measures
for the value, the breadth or the generality of a single patent. Allison &
Tiller (2003) use different patent indicators in their study of 1,093 USPTO
internet business method patents for analyzing major differences between
business method patents and the average USPTO patent in order to deter-
mine whether business method patents are of minor quality. Based on their
findings that business method patents tend to cite more prior art than the
average patent, they suggest that the selection of business method patents
used in their study is no worse than the average patent. This finding is sup-
ported by the study of Hunter (2003). In this section, the most important
patent characteristics are computed for European business method applica-
tions and are compared to the corresponding figures of the population of all
EPO patent applications.
An important procedural characteristic of patent applications is the du-
ration of the examination period at the patent office. From a firm’s per-
spective, this period is characterized by uncertainty over getting the patent
finally granted, which might determine the timing and volume of subsequent
investments in production facilities. From a regulator’s view, longer exami-
nation times might decrease the rate of erroneous grant decisions increasing
average patent quality and overall welfare. A more elaborate treatment of
these issues is contained in Harhoff & Wagner (2005). Column 1 of Ta-
ble 4 contains a brief overview of the mean examination times for business
method patents compared to the overall means for the years 1978 to 2000.
The examination of business method patents takes almost a year longer
compared to the average examination time for all patent applications at
the EPO. However, there are several potential explanations for the longer
examination times in the case of business method patents: For instance,
business method patent applications could in general be more thoroughly
examined as compared to other patents. Another explanation could be that
the examination is more time-consuming due to higher complexity involved.
Indeed, it is shown below that business method patents are characterized
by a high number of claims. A third – and probably the most likely – ex-
planation might be a shortage of examiners capable of reviewing business
method patent applications.
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INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
As shown in section 2, it is widely believed that business method patents
are granted with (too) little attention to the existing prior art. During
the examination of patent applications, prior art in the form of patents
and other printed publications (non-patent references) describing the related
technological advances is referenced by both the applicant and the examiner
in order to determine the scope of the existing prior art. Columns 2 and 3
of Table 4 show the average number of cited patents and cited non-patent
documents in both business method and all patent applications. Contrasting
the expectation that business method related applications fail to cite prior
art, it can be seen that business method related applications on average
cite more prior patents than the total average. Concerning references to
non-patent documents, business method patents do not cite less than the
average patent, but slightly more. These finding are in line with the results
for USPTO patents in Allison & Tiller (2003) and Hunter (2003).
The number of citations a patent receives by subsequent patents (forward
citations) is generally interpreted as an indication that it has contributed to
the state of the art. Previous studies have found a positive correlation with
the monetary value of the patent (see Harhoff et al. (1999) and Lanjouw
& Schankermann (2001)). The reported numbers of citations (see Table 4
Column 7) are computed within the EPO system. Only citations received
from subsequent EPO patents are identified. It is striking that business
method patents receive on average two times more citations than the average
patent. There are at least two potential explanations for this phenomenon:
First, it could be argued that due to the comparably low number of business
method patents relevant prior art for subsequent patents is contained in
only few documents, which are cited frequently. Second, the high number
of citations might also indicate that those patents are more valuable for the
patent holder than average patents. However, whether the patent holder is
able to extract higher monetary value from business method patents or not
is not clear and requires a more thorough analysis.
The claims contained in a patent file delineate the boundaries of the
property rights granted to the patent applicant by describing unique features
of the underlying invention which are protected by the patent. Column 4 of
Table 4 clearly shows that the number of claims in a business method patent
is considerably higher for business method patents than for the average
patent. The yearly breakdown shows that the gap between business method
and average patents increased considerably over the nineties. The economic
interpretation of the total number of claims is not straight forward. On the
one hand, it can be argued that each additional claim raises the probability
of an infringement. On the other hand, each additional claim in a patent
makes the description of the claimed invention more specific and therefore
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narrows the scope of the protected area (see Lanjouw & Schankermann
(2001) for a discussion of this trade-off).
A further characteristic of a European patent is the number of designated
states. As any EPO patent becomes a bundle of national patent rights
once it is granted, each applicant has to specify the countries in which he
wants to obtain patent protection. The more countries designated in an
application, the higher the resulting fees for keeping the patent alive in
each designated country. Harhoff et al. (2003) showed that the number of
designated countries is correlated with the patent value, while Guellec &
Pottelsberghe (2000) came to more ambiguous findings. Applications for
business method patents designate only slightly more countries than the
average implying that there is no big systematic difference between business
method patents and other patents.
The analysis of major patent characteristics reveals that business method
patents contain a higher number of claims, cite more patents as well as non-
patent documents and are cited by subsequent patents more frequently than
the average patent. This result does not support the hypothesis that busi-
ness method patents are of lower quality than other patents – at least if
the criteria analyzed above are interpreted as indicators of patent quality.
The findings presented here are in line with the study of USPTO business
method patents of Allison & Tiller (2003). However, it should be kept in
mind that this data cannot answer some important questions. It is unclear
whether nonpatented prior art in the area of business methods is so diverse
that examiners still miss the greatest part of it or if the examinations pro-
cess overlooks some business methods which are in common use but not
documented in written sources (National Research Council 2004, p. 50).
4.4 Post-Grant Opposition Procedures
The opposition system implemented at the EPO is a post-grant procedure
which allows third parties to challenge the validity of granted patents directly
at the EPO without taking the risk of an expensive suit before courts. This
procedure is less costly and more efficient than a pure court-based litigation
system as it is implemented in the US patent system. A detailed compar-
ison of the European and the US patent litigation system can be found in
Hall et al. (2003). Given the controversial debates on the patentability of
business methods and the fear of negative consequences from doing so, it is
a plausible assumption that this institution is used more frequently in the
sector of business methods than in other technological areas.
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE
Table 5 supports the hypothesis that business method patents are more
frequently challenged than the average patent: 108 patents (16%) of all
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granted business method patents have been challenged compared to only
39.161 (6%) of all patents at the EPO. Table 5 illustrates that, addition-
ally to higher opposition rates, opposed business method patents are more
frequently revoked by the EPO than other patents. More than 41% of the
opposed business method patents are declared invalid, while the according
level in the population is 36%. In general, oppositions lead to the revocation
of a patent if the opponent reveals new information which has not been con-
sidered in the grant decision and which prohibits the granting of a patent.
A higher revocation rate for business method patents could therefore be in-
terpreted as an indication that the EPO is not able to gather information
during the examination of business method patents as efficiently as in other
technological areas.
A closer look at these oppositions reveals that more than 60% of all
oppostions are filed in IPC group G07 ”Checking Devices” which contains
only 40% of all granted patents leading to an above average opposition rate
of almost 25% in this IPC group. Excluding IPC group G07 from the sam-
ple reduces the overall opposition rate against business method patents to
9.80%. The subgroup G07B17 ”Franking Devices” exhibits an extraordinary
opposition rate of more than 40% of all granted patents. As subsection 4.2
revealed, almost all patents in this group belong to only three applicants
(Pitney Bowes, Frankotyp-Postalia and Neopost). The high concentration
of granted patents in this technological area among only three patent holders
and the intense opposition activity makes the area of ”Franking Devices” an
interesting research topic. Due to the limited number of players, individual
IP strategies can easily be analyzed. The following subsection contains a
detailed analysis of this technological area with special attention on the use
of business method patents.
5 Strategic Use of Business Method Patents: The
Case of Franking Machines
5.1 Market-Structure
The previous sections have shown that the identified business method patents
differ from the average EPO patent with respect to important patent char-
acteristics. Additionally, one industrial sector turned out to be rather excep-
tional with respect to the intensity of competition for intellectual property
rights: the business for franking devices and mailroom technology. This
section briefly analyzes the industrial structure of this market and sheds
some light on the patenting strategies of the involved firms. This industry
is a good example for the strategic use of patents, as it is characterized by
a relatively strong litigation activity – if opposition cases at the EPO are
considered as an indicator for litigation. A similar study for the cosmet-
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ics and toilet preparations industry can be found in Hall & Harhoff (2002).
However, this brief study is different from their work as it focuses in par-
ticular on the strategic use of business method patents. It uses a second
dataset which is not restricted to business method patents identified in the
previous Section but contains all EPO patents of the major competitors in
the market for franking devices.
The basic function of a postal franking machine is to print a mark record-
ing the payment of postage on an envelope or label and to record the amount
of postage paid. A franking machine basically consists of a meter which se-
curely records the amount of postage used and a base which handles the
passage of envelopes through the meter. Apart from just paying the right
postage, franking machines also provide a wider range of services making
them central to any modern mailing services. Up-to-date franking machines
include computerized accounting tools, which allows for efficient cost control,
making it possible to track mail conveniently. The latest technological de-
velopments in franking devices can be found in the sector of two-dimensional
barcoding and the emergence of internet-based franking tools allowing users
to pay postage online and simply print the required stamps with any office
printer. As franking machines and other means of getting postage are in ef-
fect means to print money, their production, circulation and use are tightly
regulated by postal authorities. Manufacturers and independent firms wish-
ing to service franking machines and similar devices must be approved by
national agencies.
Currently, there are five important manufacturers for franking devices
(Competition Commission 2002). However, the market is controlled by only
three major competitors serving an estimated 94% share of the total market
according to the British Competition Commission (Competition Commis-
sion 2002). With a world-wide market share of 62%, Pitney Bowes (USA)
is by far the largest enterprise, followed by its smaller competitors Neo-
post (GB) – the latter acquired the Swiss manufacturer Ascom in 2002 –
and Frankotyp-Postalia (Germany) with market shares of 22% and 10%
(Competition Commission 2002) respectively. In the US, Pitney Bowes is
notorious for the aggressive use of its intellectual property rights from a set-
tlement with Hewlett Packard on a US patent infringement suit including a
far reaching cross-licensing agreement and the payment of 400 Mio. USD to
Pitney Bowes in 2001. While the patent under dispute in this case was re-
lated to a technological feature of laser printers, more recently Pitney Bowes
settled an infringement case involving business method patents (US patents
No. 5,448,641 and 5,742,683) with the major providers for internet-based
postage systems Stamps.com and E-stamps.com. The settlement included a
five-year cross-licensing agreement allowing Pitney Bowes to access patents
for online franking systems owned by Stamps.com and E-stamps.com. Both
patents mentioned in the infringement case are classified in US Class 705
(business methods) and there exist granted equivalents at the EPO.
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It is unclear whether such patents could be enforced in European courts,
but at least they cause additional uncertainty for Pitney Bowes’ competitors.
In fact, in their report on the merger of two of Pitney Bowes’ competitors –
Neopost and Ascom – the British Competition Commission noted that the
size of Pitney Bowes’ patent portfolio and its willingness to enforce its IPRs
rigorously causes major difficulties for its competitors in the development
of new products – both in Europe and the US. They either have to avoid
patent infringement by inventing around Pitney Bowes’ patents or at least to
limit the cost of licensing where licenses are required. These difficulties led
Neopost to enter a world-wide cross-licensing agreement with Pitney Bowes
under undisclosed terms (Competition Commission 2002).
5.2 Patent Strategies
In order to fully understand the patenting behavior of the competitors in
this field, a particular dataset has been constructed for this chapter. This
dataset contains all EPO patents held by franking device manufacturers and
is not restricted to the 705 equivalents identified in the previous section. In
total, this dataset comprises 588 patents (thereof 157 patents related to
business methods, see Table 6).
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
Figure 3 shows the cumulative number of granted patents at the EPO.
This figure can be interpreted as a rough estimation of the size of the patent
portfolio of the individual firms.9 As one can see, Pitney Bowes started to
patent in the early eighties, much earlier than its competitors who started
patenting only about five to ten years later. As a consequence, it currently
holds a patent portfolio which is almost threefold the portfolio of its second
biggest competitor, Neopost.
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE
Table 6 summarizes the size and the composition of the patent portfolios
with respect to the share of existing US equivalent patents in general and
the share of business method patents (granted patents with an US equiv-
alent classified in Class 705) in particular. In total, Pitney Bowes is the
most important patentee, holding 312 EPO patents. The share of existing
US equivalents to European patents (appr. 79%, see Table 6, Column 3) is
roughly identical for Pitney Bowes, Neopost and Frankotyp-Postalia, indi-
cating that the three firms pursue similar patenting strategies in terms of
9Cumulating the number of granted patents overestimates the actual size of the patent
portfolio since patents might lapse due to the non-payment of renewal fees and since
patents can be revoked in opposition proceedings.
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obtaining international protection for their IPs. However, differences among
the firms emerge in the reliance on business method patents as part of their
patenting strategies. The share of business method patents in the patent
portfolio of Pitney Bowes is highest with 31% of all patents followed by
Neopost with 19%; Frankotyp-Postalia holds only one in ten of its patents
on a business method related invention.
In general, the opposition rate against patents held by franking device
manufacturers is above average with 28% of all patents granted (compared
to about 6% for the total population). Further, big differences in the op-
position rates can be observed on the firm-level: While on average only
5% of Frankotyp-Postalia’s patents are opposed, almost 41% of all patents
granted to Pitney Bowes are opposed. Additional to these firm level differ-
ences, business method patents (patents with an US equivalent filed in class
705) are opposed more frequently than other patents in general and across
firms. Particularly interesting is the high rate of opposition against Pitney
Bowes’ business method patents, which are opposed in two of three cases.
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE
Finally, Table 7 crosstabulates opposing against opposed parties, fo-
cussing on the most active opponents and the holders of the biggest portfolios
of European business method patents. The second column of Table 7 de-
picts the total number of oppositions filed against business method patents
for each opponent. Additionally, the total number of all oppositions filed
(i.e. independently of the technological area of the opposed patent) is given
in brackets. For example, Frankotyp-Postalia filed 38 oppositions against
business method patents held by Pitney Bowes and 90 oppositions against
Pitney Bowes in total. Focusing on the four firms from the franking device
industry (Frankoty-Postalia, Neopost, Pitney Bowes and Societe´ Secap10)
reveals some interesting differences in their IP strategies: Pitney Bowes is
attacked by most of its competitors very aggressively, although it hardly uses
the opposition mechanism itself. In fact, all oppositions filed by Frankotyp-
Postalia and Neopost and almost all of Sc. Se´cap’s oppositions are targeted
exclusively against patents held by Pitney Bowes. In contrast, Pitney Bowes
only files only few oppositions against patents held by its direct competitors.
Combining the findings of this subsection, it becomes clear that Pitney
Bowes’ IP strategy is focused on building a very broad patent portfolio and
the aggressive enforcement of its IPRs in case of infringement. The numer-
ous cross-licensing agreements between Pitney Bowes and its rivals highlight
this strategy and provide evidence that the patent portfolio is used as a bar-
gaining chip in licensing negotiations. The attempt to build a very broad
10Societe´ Secap is a small manufacturer for franking devices with a negligible market
share and no own patenting activities.
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patent portfolio relies heavily on the filing of business method patents. As
a consequence, competitors try to bar Pitney Bowes from further increasing
its portfolio by opposing Pitney Bowes patents frequently. Even if those op-
positions are only of average success (they do not lead to the revocation of
the opposed patent more frequently than the average opposition), they lead
to a comparatively high ratio of revoked patents relative to the number of
granted patents. This can be interpreted as a sign for an below-average qual-
ity of Pitney Bowes patent applications and is especially true for business
method patents, which are opposed at the rate of 60%.
These findings support some of the concerns against business method
patents raised in section 2 of this paper. At least in the industrial sector of
franking devices, business method patents seem to be an integral part of an
IP-strategy which consists of building patent portfolios as large as possible
serving to increase the bargaining power of its holder in cross-licensing ne-
gotiations or in order to reduce competition in the market. A strategy well
described in Shapiro (2001). This supports the raised concerns that business
method patents can be used or misused for exclusionary purposes. Further,
the high litigatious activity in terms of oppositions taking place (which is
above average if business method patents are involved) leads to high costs
associated with the legal proceedings taking place. Finally, the report of
the British Competition Commission contains evidence, that the existence
of Pitney Bowes’ patent portfolio raises uncertainty for its competitors in
the product development process which slows down innovation.
5.3 Multivariate Analysis of Opposition against Patent Grants
In this section simple probability models of the incidence of an opposition
occurring against patents granted to the five franking device manufacturers
are estimated in order to explore how the pattern of opposition is related
to a variety of patent characteristics. Following similar studies of Harhoff
& Reitzig (2004) and Harhoff et al. (2003), the occurrence of opposition is
regressed on most of the characteristics presented in Section 4.2 (the num-
ber of claims, the number of references to patent and non-patent literature,
the number of designated states, and the number of forward citations re-
ceived within five years after application). Special attention is given to the
industrial structure by the introduction of dummy variables coding the five
patent applicants (using Pitney Bowes as reference group). Moreover the
analysis distinguishes whether a patent is related to a business method and
whether a US equivalent patent is existing or not.
In addition, several control variables are included in the models: Gen-
erality and originality measures proposed by Trajtenberg et al. (1997) are
citation-based indices which measure different aspects of the patented inno-
vation and their links to other innovations. The generality index is high if a
patent is cited by subsequent patents that belong to a wide range of fields
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and low if most referring citations are concentrated in a few fields. Hence, a
high generality index suggests that the patent influenced subsequent inno-
vations in a variety of different fields and is more general. The originality
index indicates, whether a patent cited only patents from a wide or from a
narrow set of technologies. Additionally, the share of citations defining the
general state of the art, which is not considered to be of particular relevance
(type A citations), and the share of citations indicating that the claimed
invention cannot be considered to be novel or to involve an inventive step
(type X citations) is included. A detailed description of the use of patent
citations in economic analysis can be found in Michel & Bettels (2001). The
number of different IPC classifications of a patent (as introduced by Lerner
1994) can be seen as a correlate for patent value and is contained in the es-
timations. Finally, a set of dummy variables indicating whether the patent
application was filed before 1985, between 1985 and 1989, 1990 and 1994,
or 1995 and after is included in order to capture responses to the chang-
ing legal environment and unobserved economic fluctuations over the last
decades (patents with application dates later than 1995 are the reference
group). Further, dummy variables indicating the patentee are introduced in
order to capture firm-specific effects (Pitney Bowes is the reference group).
The data set has been restricted to patents with application dates prior to
1998, yielding in total 544 patents, since forward citations received within
five years after application are included in the regression.
INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE
Table 8 contains the results of a multivariate probit analysis. The first
specification (Column 1) contains a basic model including only patent char-
acteristics and time dummies. Previous results of Harhoff & Reitzig (2004)
are confirmed: The probability of an opposition occurring is increased by
the total number of patent references contained in the document and the
corresponding share of X citations. Furthermore, the value correlates carry
a positive sign – but only the number of different IPC classifications has a
significant influence. Patents with application dates prior to 1996 are more
likely to be opposed with a maximum increase in the opposition probability
between 1990 and 1995. This phenomenon might reflect reactions of the
firms to a more benign legal climate with respect to the patentability of
business methods after 1995. An alternative explanation might be seen in
changes of the patenting strategy of the firms in the market: Realizing the
importance of intellectual property protection only at the end of the eighties
and the beginning nineties (see Figure 3), Pitney Bowes’ competitors might
have pursued a defensive patent strategy, trying to oppose Pitney Bowes’
patents before finally changing to an active filing strategy in the 90s. These
results are robust to different model specifications.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 8 contain additional dummy variables of the
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existence of a US equivalent patent and business method patents. They
indicate that business method patents are about 15% more likely to be op-
posed, compared to non-business method patents. Finally, Column 4 con-
tains the results of a specification including additional dummy variables for
each firm, using Pitney Bowes as the reference group. The result that busi-
ness method patents are more likely to be opposed (the probability of the
occurrence of opposition taking place is increased by almost 15% if business
method patents are involved) remains rather stable after controlling for the
identity of the patent holder, too. Furthermore, patents owned by Pitney
Bowes’ competitors are significantly less likely to be opposed. The proba-
bility that patents by Frankotyp-Postalia, Neopost and Ascom are opposed
is about 20% lower compared to Pitney Bowes. This is a consequence of
the fact that Pitney Bowes patents are more disputed than other patents,
as described in the previous subsection, reflecting the averting strategies of
Pitney Bowes’ competitors.
6 Conclusion
The discussion on business method patents mainly focusses on the US patent
system, implicitly assuming that business method patents are not granted
to a relevant extent in Europe. This assumption is mainly based on the mis-
conception that business method patents are excluded from patentability in
Europe. However, they are admissible legally and a closer look reveals that
business method patents are actually being granted by the European Patent
Office. A sample of 1,901 patent applications relating to business methods
has been identified in this paper. The analysis of patent characteristics for
this sample yielded mixed evidence concerning the potentially low quality of
business method patents. Compared to the average of all European patent
applications, they cite slightly less previous patents but more non-patent
documents and receive a significantly higher number of forward citations.
Additionally, business method patents are characterized by a longer exami-
nation period. However, the long pendency in examination is more likely to
be caused by a shortage of examiners in the field than by an above-average
examination accuracy. More important, business method patents are more
often revoked than other patents, when legally challenged in opposition pro-
ceedings at the EPO. This is an indication that the EPO is not able to
gather prior art as efficiently as in other technologies (despite the higher
number of references business method patents contain).
Further, a micro-level analysis of the industry for franking devices yielded
insights in the strategic use of business method patents, supporting some
of the concerns raised against the patentability of business methods. In
this industry, one firm relies heavily on business method patents in order
to construct a large patent portfolio. This behavior induces its competitors
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to fight back by opposing against its patents at an enormous frequency.
In fact, more than 40% of its patents are opposed overall and 60% of its
patents on business methods are attacked by competitors. A multivariate
analysis of the occurrence of opposition proceedings taking place in this
industry revealed that the probability of an opposition occurring is actually
about 15% increased for business method patents even after controlling for
patent characteristics and the identity of the patent holder. This finding
illustrates that business method patents are more controversial than other
patents. The findings from this case study therefore support the concerns
that the granting of business method patents might lead to inefficiently high
litigation cost.
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_ _ _ Applications filed with primary classification in 705
____ Patents granted with primary classification in 705
........ Patents granted with classification in 705
Figure 1: USPTO business method patent applications and grants.
(Note that applications do not include Continued Prosecution Appli-
cations and Requests for Continued Examination.) Source: Own
calculations and USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/pbmethod/
applicationfiling.htm, latest visit on September, 9th, 2004.
EPO Origin of EPO Patent Applicant
Outcome Europe Japan USA Other Total
pending 137 – 141 – 587 – 21 – 886 –
grant 224 74.67% 156 81.25% 295 59.60% 14 50.00% 689 67.89%
withdrawal 59 19.67% 32 16.67% 172 34.75% 12 42.86% 275 27.09%
refusal 17 5.67% 4 2.08% 28 5.66% 2 7.14% 51 5.02%
Total 437 100% 333 100% 1,082 100% 49 100% 1,901 100%
Table 1: Outcomes of application procedures by applicants’ country of
origin 1978 - 2003.
In a Pearson χ2-test the differences between the applicant groups turned
out to be significant at the 1% level (χ2(6) = 46.40 excluding pending cases,
χ2(9) = 117.24 including pending cases).
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_ _ _ Applications from US inventors
____ Applications from EP inventors
........ Applications from JP inventors
Figure 2: Number of applications for business method patents filed by
application year and country of origin of the inventor.






















_ _ _ Grants to Pitney Bowes
____ Grants to Francotyp Postalia
........ Grants to Neopost
_._._._. Grants to Ascom
Figure 3: Cumulated European patent grants for major competitors in the
market for franking devices.
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Outcomes of Application BMP Total
Procedures Cases Percent Cases Percent
Application pending 886 – 330,673 –
Patent granted 689 67.88% 606,967 64.86%
Patent withdrawn 275 27.10% 287,110 30.68%
Grant refused 51 5.02% 40,309 4.31%
Other loss . . 1,447 0.15%
Total 1,901 100% 1,266,506 100%
Table 2: Outcomes of application procedures of business method inventions
compared to the total population of applications at the EPO 1978 - 2003
(percentages have been calculated excluding pending procedures).
In a Pearson χ2-test the differences between business method and the
average patent application turned out to be significant at the 1% level
(χ2(3) = 416.37 excluding pending cases, χ2(4) = 417.24 including pending
cases).
Patent Applicant Country Appli- Patents Oppositions Patents
cations granted received revoked
Pitney Bowes US 192 99 67 26
IBM Corp. US 99 46 1 0
NCR US 71 20 2 1
Frankotyp-Postalia DE 46 11 1 0
Neopost Ltd. UK 45 27 5 2
AT&T US 39 11 1 1
Fujitsu JP 37 15 1 1
Hitachi JP 35 9 1 1
Sony JP 30 10 0 0
Siemens DE 24 12 3 2
Matsushita Electr. JP 23 9 0 0
Toshiba JP 21 15 4 1
Sharp JP 20 12 0 0
Sun Microsystems US 16 5 0 0
Total 778 345 91 37
Table 3: Most important patent applicants for business method patents at
the European Patent Office 1978 - 2003.
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Application (1) Duration of (2) References to (3) References to (4) Claims (5) PCT (6) Number of (7) Citations
Year examination Patents Non-Patents Application desg. States within 5 Yrs.
BMP All BMP All BMP All BMP All BMP All BMP All BMP All
1978 – 1979 3.90* 3.09 3.00 4.16 1.18* 0.40 11.45 9.44 0.18 0.08 5.18 5.97 1.64* 0.66
1980 – 1984 5.02* 3.71 3.98 3.79 0.66 0.56 13.51* 10.54 0.14 0.09 6.06* 6.88 1.90* 0.81
1985 – 1989 5.52* 4.29 3.69 3.50 0.97* 0.78 13.14* 11.45 0.15 0.14 6.60* 7.54 1.90* 1.00
1990 – 1994 5.36* 4.30 3.37 3.21 1.11 0.97 17.25* 12.60 0.23 0.27 7.37* 8.11 2.49* 1.00
1995 – 2000 4.50* 3.91 2.21* 2.48 0.77* 0.84 23.12* 15.39 0.51 0.48 10.78 10.72 0.83* 0.30
Average 5.03* 4.08 2.68* 2.99 0.84 0.80 20.20* 13.34 0.39* 0.30 9.49 9.38 1.29* 0.64
Table 4: Patent characteristics of patent applications relating to business methods compared to all patent applications at
the European Patent Office.
* denotes significant differences at the 5% level using a Student’s t-test on the equality of means.
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Outcomes of Opposition BMP Total
Procedures Cases Percent Cases Percent
Opposition pending 12 – 5,892 –
Revocation of the patent 40 41.67% 11,997 36.06%
Rejection of the opposition 27 28.13% 9,682 29.10%
Patent amended 26 27.08% 9,129 27.44%
Opposition closed 3 3.13% 2,461 7.38%
Total 108 100% 39,161 100%
Table 5: Outcomes of opposition procedures as of December, 27th, 2003
at the European Patent Office. Note that percentages have been calculated
excluding procedures still pending.
In a Pearson χ2-test the differences between business method and the av-
erage patent application turned out to be not significant at the 5% level
(χ2(3) = 3.251 excluding pending cases, χ2(4) = 4.713 including pending
cases).
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Applicant Granted EPO Patents US equivalent exists US equivalent in 705
Patents Opposition Share of all Opposition Share of all Opposition
Rate Grants Rate Grants Rate
Pitney Bowes 312 41.35% 79.17% 40.49% 31.73% 60.00%
Frankotyp-Postalia 75 5.33% 77.33% 6.89% 14.67% 9.09%
Neopost 144 14.58% 77.78% 9.81% 18.75% 18.52%
Ascom 12 8.33% 83.33% 10.00% 25.00% 0.00%
Frama 15 20.00% 100.00% 20.00% 26.67% 25.00%
Total 588 28.31% 79.21% 26.03% 26.67% 44.00%
Table 6: US and European patent grants of major producers of franking devices between 1978 and 2003. For European
patents the existence of US equivalents and opposition rates are reported.
Oppositions Holder of opposed patents
Opponent filed Frankotyp Fujitsu Hitachi NCR Neopost Pitney Bowes Siemens Toshiba
Frankotyp 38 (90) . . . . . 38 (90) . .
Gao 6 (23) . 0 (3) 1 (1) 0 (3) . . 0 (3) 2 (13)
Giesecke & Devrient 16 (34) . 1 (4) 1 (7) 1 (4) . 0 (2) 2 (9) 0 (8)
Neopost Ltd. 18 (49) . . . . . 18 (49) . .
Pitney Bowes 9 (25) 1 (4) . . . 5 (18) . . .
Siemens 8 (197) . 0 (30) 0 (82) 0 (2) . . 0 (1) 1 (82)
Socie´te´ Secap 9 (23) . . . . . 9 (20) . .
Total 104 (441) 1 (4) 1 (37) 1 (90) 2 (9) 5 (21) 65 (165) 2 (13) 3 (103)
Table 7: Crosstabulation of opposing and opposed firms at the EPO considering cases on business method patents filed
between 1978 and 2003. Note: Figures in brackets denote the total number of opposition filings at the EPO of the opponents.
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Opposition (0) (1) (2) (3) (4)
occurring Mean dF/dx dF/dx dF/dx dF/dx
Claims 13.17 0.0021 0.0029 0.013 0.0015
(1.07) (0.99) (0.64) (0.73)
Ref. to patents 4.58 0.0193* 0.0193* 0.0175 0.0198*
(2.05) (2.04) (1.84) (2.11)
Ref. to non-patents 0.37 -0.0044 -0.0042 -0.0012 -0.0055
(-0.19) (-0.18) (-0.24) (2.33)
Originality 0.06 -0.0261 -0.0276 -0.0500 -0.0151
(-0.22) (-0.23) (-0.24) (-0.13)
Generality 0.05 0.1708 0.1620 0.1728 0.1237
(1.33) (1.26) (1.35) (0.97)
Share X-References 0.08 0.2788* 0.2810* 0.2877* 0.2305*
(2.37) (2.40) (2.45) (1.98)
Share A-References 0.59 0.0092 0.0103 0.0323 0.0231
(0.16) (0.18) (0.54) (0.39)
Forward citations 1.10 0.0168 0.0176 0.0137 0.0174
(1.54) (1.61) (1.27) (1.62)
PCT application+ 0.02 -0.1652 -0.1620 -0.1486 -0.1424
(-1.02) (-1.05) (-0.86) (-0.73)
Total IPC Classes 1.62 0.0479* 0.0480* 0.0550* 0.0416
(2.11) (2.11) (2.41) (1.84)
Designated States 5.18 0.0132 0.0131 0.0108* 0.0252*
(1.49) (1.48) (2.22) (2.36)
US equivalent exists+ 0.79 -0.0342 -0.0851 -0.0908
(-0.73) (-1.67) (-1.75)










Appl. before 1986+ 0.17 0.1422* 0.1461* 0.1382* 0.0857
(2.43) (2.48) (2.34) (1.46)
Appl. between 1986/1990+ 0.25 0.1647* 0.1638* 0.1607* 0.1047*
(3.52) (3.50) (3.44) (2.16)
Appl. between 1991/1995+ 0.44 0.2546* 0.2529* 0.2462* 0.2130*
(3.52) (3.05) (2.94) (2.38)
Observations 554 554 554 554 554
LR χ2 117.46 117.99 126.48 159.18
Pseudo R2 0.1773 0.1781 0.1910 0.2403
Table 8: Probit Models of the incidence of opposition against granted
patents. Table shows marginal effects (change in probability for a one unit
change in x). Z-values of the estimates are given in brackets.
* Significant at the 5%-level. + Discrete variables.
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